On or about May 1, 1998 the U.S. Senate approved by a vote of 81 to 19 to amend the treaty of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to allow it to expand into Central Europe. Among the first waive of new NATO members is Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.

Critics of the Senate’s handling of this issue noted that the NATO expansion debate at best was lackluster and incomplete. The Senate’s relative lack of interest in one of America’s most significant foreign policy issues was not lost on the press which called attention to Senator John Warner’s observation that the Senate displayed "an appalling lack of interest in foreign policy." (NYT 3/19/98 "Senate Struggles to Pay attention to the Remapping of NATO," by Katharine Q. Seelye). In spite of a last minute grass roots effort mounted by Business Leaders for Sensible Responsibilities (Executive Director, Gary Ferdman), headed by Ben Cohen, founder of Ben and Jerry’s, against expansion, public engagement on the issue was minimal. As a backdrop to the Senate’s proceedings, was the unsettling activity of the powerful arms lobby organized under the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO, headed by Bruce L. Jackson, director of strategic planning for Lockheed, and the State Department Office of NATO Expansion headed by Jeremy K. Rosner.

The NATO Expansion non-debate illustrates an important aspect about the contemporary foreign policy process which underscores the significance of the ICLTD’s educational work--that without grass roots public engagement, much of foreign policy for good or for ill will be shaped by organized lobbies with narrow objectives. That the arms industry was able to play such a major role in lobbying for expansion is particularly disturbing because an arms bonanza in Central Europe is unlikely to facilitate relations with the Russians, although it will make many arms dealers richer. One should also not ignore the role of the Administration’s lobbying effort, utilizing the State Department’s own staff. The result was a debate more for show than intended to assess the risks of expansion.

At the same time, it may well be that the Clinton Administration bought NATO expansion at a dear price. Jesse Helms, the controversial Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, surprisingly backed expansion and insured ready approval of the measure by his Committee. One can only speculate whether the Administration’s concessions on the 1996 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which is unlikely to be allowed to come up for debate in the near future, its failure to support William Weld’s nomination to be U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, its wishy washy position on U.N. dues, and its reluctance to back numerous international initiatives like the 1997 treaty banning land mines and the current initiatives to establish a permanent international criminal court and to regulate the small arms trade were, in fact, concessions to Mr. Helms and his supporters.

However one assesses the political undercurrents of NATO expansion, it will pose serious challenges to the Atlantic Alliance. In these pages, it was proposed that over time NATO would have to be supplanted by other security organizations less encumbered by anti-Russian baggage. In the short term, however, it was a foregone conclusion that Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary would be admitted; especially after the Madrid Conference in Summer 1997 where commitments were made to the first waive nations.

Last time, we noted that the ball game with respect to compelling Iraq to destroy its weapons of mass destruction was whether it was possible to reconstruct the Gulf coalition. We thought that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had made great progress on this front. Our optimism, however, was premature. Unable to muster significant support among Arab countries for military action, the U.S. found itself embarrassingly isolated in the region and in the Security Council. This took a toll on the Administration’s policy back home. The denouement was the Town Meeting at Ohio State University in February,1998, at which the administration was expected to state its case for intervention. The Town Meeting was attended by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, William Cohen and National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger. The result was a public relations disaster for the administration and marked the beginning of efforts to abandon its muscular policy.

The situation in Kosovo, Serbia where the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic is engaged in a vicious counterinsurgency against Albanian separatists from the region, is deteriorating rapidly. Special Serbian forces in the region familiar with the ethnic cleansing operations in Bosnia are apparently at it again. The Kosovo Liberation Army which is leading the fight for secession is making with each passing day a peaceful resolution more and more remote. In assessing the situation, readers are encouraged to pay close attention to what NATO is doing and if it does intervene on what legal basis it will be intervening. The fact that the dispute is an internal Serbian conflict raises serious political and legal issues about the when and how of any humanitarian intervention. From a legal standpoint, the Security Council will have to act pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter which invests the Security Council with the authority to take action to preserve international peace and security. Under the UN Charter, the Security Council can authorize NATO as a regional organization to act out of area, i.e. beyond the geographic scope mandated under the NATO Treaty. One issue to consider is whether a humanitarian intervention could be initiated to prevent or halt an internal process without there first having to be a Security Council finding that the situation posed a threat to peace and security, i.e. whether internal, massive human rights abuses are, themselves, enough to trigger intervention, even if they are localized and do not give rise to the refugee flows (like in the Rwandan situation) that increase cross-border pressures.

Unilateral, humanitarian action by the United States or by NATO, on the other hand, without direction from the Security Council, or at least a finding from it that the situation poses a threat to international peace and security, could, possibly, pose a legal problem for such intervention.

Russia and Indonesia:

What do both of these great nations have in common---both are finding that their internal politics is being altered under the pressure of international financial institutions determined to head-off economic meltdowns. In the case of Indonesia, President Suharto's failure to abide by international agreements with the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") provoking investor flight, accelerated economic collapse and, ultimately, the collapse of his regime. In the case of Russia, that country’s legislature has been forced to consider enacting austerity measures in order to meet IMF prerequisites to the disbursement of a multi-billion dollar bail-out package. If these events mean anything, they are evidence of the power of globalization to break down the resistance of nation states to outside influence, especially to the growing influence of international financial organizations determined to implement a global fiscal policy.

Nigeria:

The recent death of Sani Abacha, the military dictator of Nigeria, raised hopes and the death of Mashood Abiola, the torchbearer of democracy and Abacha’s arch-rival, dashed them, but in paradoxical fashion the passing of both personalities may have created opportunities to construct democracy on a firmer footing. If any characteristic of African development has frustrated the emergence of functioning democratic institutions it is the undue importance attributed to personalities over institutions. Charismatic leadership has rarely made for lasting and stable growth. What Africa needs more than charismatic leadership is a movement to establish institutions that will dilute and thereby democratize power. Multiparty states with potent legislatures, subservient military organizations and executives subject to legislative challenge is a worthwhile ambition and is more likely to lead to sustained development. The United States may have an important role to play in promoting Nigeria’s efforts to develop such a democratic process. On this point, the development of an aggressive and pro-active U.S. Africa policy could prove critical. The failure of the U.S. Congress to pass the African Growth and Opportunity Act this term was a set-back in this regard. Although controversial in many respects the bill did symbolize the most significant commitment to African development in many years. President Clinton’s recent trip to the region was critical to promoting the first signs of serious engagement. There is concern, however, that the Presidential visit will accomplish little in the way of strengthening the U.S.’s long-term commitment to Africa. The role the U.S. plays in the Nigerian crisis may be the best indicator of things to come.

The International Criminal Court:

Before closing this commentary, it should be mentioned that on July 17, over one hundred nations concluded a treaty to establish the world’s first international criminal court. A significant objectant to this treaty is the United States which fears the prospect of a renegade court prosecuting American soldiers stationed abroad for war crimes. Although some scholars have noted some possible doctrinal problems with the United State’s acceding to such a treaty, i.e., would such accession be constitutional, the ostensible basis for the U.S. objection -- that the International Court’s actions could be politically motivated -- has not been that persuasive in international circles. The treaty provides that for the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to be triggered under its complementarity doctrine, a national legal system would have to be unwilling or unable to prosecute war criminals -- a situation unlikely to apply to the American justice system.

Notwithstanding the unlikelihood that the scenario posited by the United States could or would ever happen, the factual finding on the issue of complementarity would have to be made by the International Criminal Court, itself, which would, in effect, be sitting in judgment on the processes of the U.S. legal system.

In the final analysis, the United States is once again at odds with the international community which may, through the imperfect mechanism of an international criminal court, be able to fashion legal rules and cultivate norms of conduct that the United States, one day, may not be able to ignore.

The above commentary represents the personal views of the President of the ICLTD and should not be construed as representing the official position of the organization. Readers are encouraged to send in their comments and submit brief articles for publication.