Rye Brook, New York 10573, U.S.A

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E mail: icltd@icltd.org

Website: http://www.icltd.org

President’s Report

The ICLTD has spent much of its time re-tooling projects so that the goals of the organization better fit its capacities.

First, The Global Reach Program on Foreign Affairs Study, which was conceived of as a year-long research and writing program, has been re-fashioned into the Global Reach Independent Study Program, which affords individuals, from students to mid-career professionals, an opportunity to conduct research and writing for the ICLTD on a topic of general or personal interest in the areas of international law, economics, politics, and diplomacy.

The paradigm for this revised program was the independent study project that the ICLTD sponsored for Ellen Javor, a student at Pace University Law School, who worked closely with the ICLTD on a research project concerning American and Canadian approaches to trade and human rights policy. Not only did Ms. Javor produce a paper of interest—"A Comparison of American and Canadian Approaches to Human Rights and Trade Policy Towards China" (which can be found on the ICLTD’s web site, under Reports and Essays), but the ICLTD, in conjunction with Pace’s International Law Society, organized a successful forum in April, 1999, based on the paper. Thomas Niles, President of the U.S. Council for International Business, and Deputy General Consul of the Canadian Consulate in New York, Dwayne Wright, participated as guest speakers. The program also marked the first event in the ICLTD’s American-Canadian Policy Series.

Michael Schaff, a student at Hofstra Law School, is currently working with the ICLTD on another independent study project, the goal of which is to develop educational materials on the World Trade Organization ("WTO") for high school students.

To help the program along, a generous donation of $500 by the Law Office of Taufiq Choudhury shall be used to reimburse participants for costs incurred by them in pursuing their independent study.

Subject to human resource considerations, the ICLTD expects to sponsor dozens of independent study programs, which shall result not only in the production of educational materials useful in the effort to educate the public on global issues, but data that can be assimilated by the ICLTD into its own data resources to assist others in their research.

Second, the ICLTD has re-tooled its Africa Outreach Program into the ICLTD’s Campaign for Global Education, an effort to bring to high schools an educational infrastructure that can help teachers and students supplement the current curriculum on global studies and provide resources, including the capacity to develop ad hoc programs on special topics. For this program, the ICLTD has developed model materials on Africa History and National Reconciliation, which can be accessed through the ICLTD’s web site under Reports and Essays. The ICLTD’s efforts in this regard have received a boost from Laura Miller, Instructional Specialist for the Manhattan Public Schools. Ms. Miller facilitated what is hoped will be a pilot relationship between the ICLTD and the School for Young Women’s Leadership in Harlem. There are other schools the ICLTD is also interested in working with to help develop new approaches and materials in the area of global education.

A related project, which is being spearheaded by ICLTD director, Mark von Sternberg, is the Humanitarian Law Initiative, the goal of which is to develop educational materials for high school students on the Law of War.

Third, the ICLTD has scaled back its ambitious GRISIRA project (Global Reach Information System on International Risk Assessment). That program, the success of which depended on recruiting student researchers to develop risk assessment papers, has been unable, due to its own human resources limitations, to obtain the necessary student assistance. Instead, the ICLTD has decided to work on events and more specific research papers focusing on methods of analyzing political and economic risks. The first event proposed under this new format is a forum on economic and political risk indicators. This kind of program is expected to interest members of the financial community and involve the participation of investment banks and ratings agencies with expertise in trying to predict economic and political trends.

Fourth, the ICLTD, subject to discussions with advisor, Tomas Ryan de Heredia, intends to scale back its administrative role in the NYCLA Summer Program, which it co-sponsored in Summer, 1999, to focus on developing its other projects. Many current leaders and advisors of the ICLTD established the Summer Research Internship for Law Students on Public International Law and Human Rights in Summer, 1994. The program has successfully met the needs of students interested in learning about public international law and human rights and resulted in several solid research reports, some of which are accessible to readers on the ICLTD’s web site under Reports and Essays.

Finally, the ICLTD has made great progress in developing its web site—www.icltd.org—which I recommend for anyone interested in global affairs and international law. Apart from adding additional links to its Links Page, which now contains almost 200 links to sites concerning foreign policy and international law, the ICLTD has added two interactive

fora -- the Global Reach Forum on World Affairs Education and the Global Reach Forum on World Affairs. The former is for teachers and students interested in developing new approaches to global education. The latter is for any member of the public interested in engaging in a dynamic dialogue on contemporary foreign policy issues. Most recently, the ICLTD linked part of its INFODAT data base to its site. The 1997-1998 INFODAT Data Base can be accessed by a password provided for an annual subscription fee of $15.00. INFODAT should be a very useful source of information for persons interested in doing research on a contemporary issue or finding out who is. Since icltd.org came on line in September 1998, it has grown into a much more user friendly and comp-rehensive site.

For the ICLTD’s high school education partners, the organization’s web site is expected to be a critical component in the effort to promote a constructive dialogue between educators and foreign affairs professionals.

Board of Directors

The Board of Directors of the ICLTD met on July 21, 1999.

Lee Alan Adlerstein was elected to the ICLTD’s Advisory Council. Mr. Adlerstein, a senior litigator in the New York Attorney General’s office, has spent years following the Middle East Peace Process, and has offered his advice to the organization on Middle East programming. In November 1999, Mr. Adlerstein participated in a fact-finding mission to Israel on the current status of Israeli-Palestinian relations.  

The ICLTD welcomes Mr. Adlerstein, who has been a long-time supporter of the organization’s work in the field of global education.

A motion to amend the bylaws to allow Resolutions by Consent without the requirement of a meeting was unanimously passed as Board Resolution 21 ("R 21"). The purpose of the

Resolution was to prepare the way for expanding the

board with the view to diversifying its mem-bership. Board expansion has been on the agenda for several meetings but has not yet occurred. 

As a result of R.21, the ICLTD hopes that persons potentially interested in becoming board members will be less concerned about having to physically attend every board meeting.

 All Readers are invited to attend the ICLTD board meeting. If you are interested in attending, please contact the ICLTD office at 914-935-0015 

As far as fiscal controls are concerned, the ICLTD has demonstrated the ability to accomplish a great deal with limited resources. Purchases by the organization have been oriented to improving software, enhancing the ability of the organization to publish brochures and other informational materials, and making its web site more comprehensive. Because the ICLTD principally operates in the virtual world, it has been able to eliminate substantial overhead in terms of rents and labor costs.

Because of limited financial resources, however, human resources, in terms of number of researchers, writers and outreach managers have been too few. In short, despite the generous help that the Advisory Council has provided the Executive Director, the latter is overburdened with the responsibility of managing the organization in addition to engaging in project development and fund-raising.

Since the last ICLTD Reporter (February, 1999), the international

landscape has dramatically changed, creating both tensions within international

organizations like the United Nations and within domestic systems. In the United States, the last year has been marked by a more intense competition between the Executive and Legislative branches over the foreign policy agenda. Although the present commentary cannot possibly address the issues raised by the many events that have transpired over the last year, certain events clearly stand out as significant.

The policy decisions that led to NATO’s first military action since its founding in 1949 will long be a subject for debate as will be the issue of how significant it was in changing the dynamics of international relations. At least in the short run, it cannot be denied that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, Yugoslavia was noteworthy in several respects.

First, it brought human rights more to the center of international policy making. By all accounts, NATO’s own moral compass, not its collective sense of strategy, was the principal catalyst for action.

Second, the Kosovo War signaled the ascendancy of regional organizations like NATO and the eclipse of the UN Security Council (the "SC") as the principal international institution for preserving international and regional peace and security. Until there is some measure of Security Council reform, it is unlikely that the institution will be able to transcend the parochial interests of its permanent members to affect events. An example of this paralysis is the inability of the Security Council adequately to address Iraq’s defiance of SC Resolutions calling on it to dismantle its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs.

Third, and related to the first and second points, is that Kosovo represented at the close of the first millennium the triumph of Western-type globalism over the traditional notion (advanced by Russia and China in the Security Council) that sovereign states should not have to answer to the international community for their domestic policies.

Some pundits have opined that Kosovo was the culmination of the drive since the Second World War to make states, like Yugoslavia, more accountable to their people. But whether the Kosovo War will be considered a watershed in international affairs will have much to do with whether its lessons are integrated into operating policies in the future. On this score, there is great room for skepticism. Like the Persian Gulf War before it, the way in which the Kosovo War ended may well be a false sign that we have entered a new era.

To many critics of the Clinton Administration’s handling of the crisis, Kosovo represents a textbook example of how poor diplomatic strategy can lead to war (à la World War I). The objective behind the Rambouillet negotiations (February-March, 1999), which brought the Yugoslav Government of Slobodan Milosevic into reluctant dialogue with the Albanian, Kosovo Liberation Army ("KLA") under the auspices, principally, of France and Britain, was to force a settlement between the parties over whom NATO (the "North Atlantic Treaty Organization") had little direct control.

Regarding President Slobodan Milosevic, NATO underestimated his resolve to maintain the geographic integrity of Yugoslavia. In Yugoslavia’s view, by positioning itself as the protector of Kosovar autonomy, NATO aimed to partition the country. Regarding the Kosovar Albanians, the U.S. had little rapport with the KLA leadership and less than substantial control over the shaping of its policies. For example, even today, the KLA maintains its commitment, albeit mutely, to Kosova independence, an issue that might well explode in NATO’s face. That the U.S. was, ultimately, successful in extracting from the Albanians an endorsement for the proposed peace treaty was directly related to the U.S.’s avowed commitment to enforce a settlement whether the parties agreed to it or not.

In such circumstances, many have argued that it would have been prudent for the Clinton Administration to have had a Plan B, but it didn’t. There was no strategic concept beyond Rambouille and the failure of the negotiations constituted the trip-wire for intervention. But the intervention was reluctant. Playing to domestic critics, President Clinton knocked a pillar out from under NATO diplomacy by declaring that a ground war involving U.S. troops would not be an option. Although it will be a matter for speculation whether Clinton’s no ground forces pledge, in fact, delayed the resolution of the conflict, logic would suggest that it did. For one thing, the prospect for a ground offensive may well have had a decisive effect on Milosevic insofar as a successful campaign would likely have led to the overthrow or displacement of the Yugoslav government. Milosevic knew from the experience of Sadaam Hussein that political institutions can survive an air war. For another thing, Milosevic appeared to believe that time was on his side. Although NATO demonstrated surprising unity of purpose throughout the War, it is doubtful that unity could have been maintained if the War had continued for an extended period and civilian casualties mounted. Indeed, in the frenetic diplomacy that ended the conflict, NATO was clearly squirming in the face of an increasingly complicated military situation.

Not only did NATO lose control over the dynamic that led it to commence the war, but, moreover, it needed the help of Russia to get it out. If Kosovo demonstrated anything, it is that NATO does not have the capacity to act on its own in the Balkans without a minimum of Russian diplomatic support. Indeed, this fact would seem to undercut one of the main thrusts of NATO expansion, which is, in effect, to marginalize Russian strategic influence in Europe. In Kosovo, NATO desperately needed Russia to support a Security Council Resolution authorizing NATO’s presence in that region. It was Russia’s shift against Yugoslavia that ultimately brought Milosevic to heel, not the NATO bombing campaign per se.

Part of the conundrum NATO found itself in was that the legality of its actions was highly questionable in light of the fact that it never obtained Security Council authorization for the intervention. For an in-depth review of this issue, readers are encouraged to read the dialogue between the Executive Director of the ICLTD, Robert I. Goodman, and Professor Howard Schiffman, which can be found at the ICLTD’s World Affairs Forum. Readers should also review Yash Aggarwal’s paper, "On the Legality and Implications of NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo," which, likewise, can be found on the web site under Reports and Essays. Suffice it to say that policy-makers apparently paid little attention to the legality (as opposed to the morality) of their actions, which created severe problems for NATO on the Security Council level. Milosevic naturally benefited from the legally ambiguous position in which NATO found itself. Indeed, he argued that the refugee problem, which was cited as the basis for the intervention, was actually precipitated by it. Although Yugoslavia’s position on this score is untenable in that there was evidence of ethnic cleansing before NATO’s bombing attack, it is apparent that NATO failed to protect the Albanian population (in part because the use of ground troops was not an option). Again, the shift in emphasis—from prevention—to damage control-- evidenced a slap-dash, rather than strategic, concept of the Kosovo problem. That NATO found itself embroiled in this conflict was the result of miscalculation; that it found itself in administrative control of Kosovo without a battlefield loss was a matter of pure luck.

In the aftermath of the War, the popular history will probably cite Kosovo as a military success. And yet, an analysis of the decision-making process that went into guiding NATO policy in this period reveals a startling lack of cohesion. Obsessed with placating domestic constituencies in the wake of the Lewinski Affair, the Clinton Administration did not, apparently, have the stomach to make a full commitment of U.S. resources to resolve the conflict quickly. It is the tentativeness with which the U.S. approached the question of the use of ground troops in Kosovo that has precipitated the current debate over the European Union’s recent proposal to establish a European defense component of the Alliance. ("NATO Meets on European Plan for Strike Force," (NYT 12/16/99)

Finally, there is the unresolved question of how to define the doctrine of humanitarian intervention so that it can become a component of a principled policy of intervention. Pundits have quipped that although NATO may have survived Kosovo, the world will have to wait many more years for another intervention of this kind. The problem posed by reactive diplomacy cannot be underestimated. The danger, ironically, is not that interventions will proliferate but that there will be an undue reluctance to engage in them. (See the recent UN Report on the Genocide in Rwanda, in which it is noted that as a result of its experience in Somalia, the Clinton Administration was reluctant to commit American troops for peacekeeping operations in Rwanda). ("Inquiry Says UN Inertia in ’94 Worsened Genocide in Rwanda," (NYT 12/17/99))

On the coattails of the Kosovo intervention, the UN Security Council authorized a peace enforcement force led by Australia to restore order and civilian government to East Timor. The intervention, which has led to Kosovo like, UN administrative control over East Timor, was thought to be necessary as a result of Indonesia’s inability (or reluctance) to disarm pro-Indonesia, anti-separatist, militias allegedly connected to its military. The chaos in East Timor came in the aftermath of a UN supervised plebiscite in Spring, 1999 in which an overwhelming majority of East Timorese voted for independence from Indonesian. Although critics have charged that the international response to the humanitarian crisis in East Timor was too timid, it is significant that, ultimately, international pressure on Indonesia was successful in compelling that nation to invite an international force into a territory in which it believed it had a sovereign interest. Both the Kosovo and East Timor interventions evidence the slow but mounting pressure on nation states to conform to international norms of state conduct. 

The collapse of the Seattle talks to set the agenda for the proposed Millennium Round of trade negotiations (the last round was called the Uruguay Round) is another important event of the year. Since the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1995 (which replaced the system of talks convened under the auspices of the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade), there has been an increased push by the developed world to liberalize further international trading rules. The United States, in particular, has been at the vanguard of nations seeking the elimination of subsidies, particularly to farmers and other protected industries, more stringent rules concerning the dumping of products at below cost prices, and more open markets for genetically modified foods. At the same time, the U.S. has pressed for a greater consideration of labor and environmental issues. Concerning the U.S. approach, President Clinton declared, "… I am determined to move forward on the path of free trade and economic growth while ensuring a human face is put on the global economy." ("Impasse on Trade Delivers a Stinging Blow to Clinton," (NYT 12/5/99))

Alas, it wasn’t meant to be. The WTO, which became all things to all people, failed fundamentally as a consensus-building institution. The talks collapsed. Several factors led to this result. First, some have argued that the Clinton Administration’s effort to meld free trade and social policy was, inherently, unworkable. In his recent article in Foreign Affairs ("Learning to Love the WTO," Foreign Affairs (September /October 1999)), Marcus Noland, former Senior Economist at the Council of Economic Advisors, observed that trade policy would be undermined if held hostage to the demands of narrow constituencies to integrate labor and environmental standards into a program of free trade. Noland advocated separate treaties outside of the WTO framework that would address these non-trade-related concerns.

Second, was the difficult atmosphere for the talks that prevailed as a result of international resistance to U.S. Trade policy. The Asian economic crisis made developing nations sensitive to U.S. power in international economic institutions and U.S. efforts to impose on developing nations unrestricted markets. The first taste of the battle brewing between developed and developing nations was the controversy surrounding the question of who would be Director-General of the WTO. (Michael Moore from New Zealand was ultimately chosen to succeed Renato Ruggiero as WTO Director-General, but only after it was agreed that his term of office would be shortened and that his rival, Dr. Supachai Panichpakdi from Thailand, would succeed him). That the WTO has been criticized by many developing nations for being secretive and "non-transparent" doubtless reflects their view that the U.S. has, in effect, commandeered the organization for its own purposes. In sum, at least part of the reason why Seattle failed was because the WTO became too identified with the interests of the developed world, particularly, the United States. It is ironic to note in this regard that President Clinton’s effort to integrate labor and environmental standards with free trade rules was also criticized by developing nations such as Egypt who charged that the U.S. was attempting to hoist its values on others. Thus, the Administration drew the enmity of both labor and environmental non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") for not going far enough to humanize free trade and the ire of the developing world for going too far in imposing labor and environmental standards on their domestic systems. In the end result, the controversies that rocked the WTO reflected deep international falt-lines between and among the U.S., its allies, and the vast majority of the developing world.

The third factor that contributed to the failure of trade talks were the disputes between the U.S. and its own allies (the European Union and Japan) over fundamental trade policies relating to subsidies and dumping. As one American observer noted, "[w]e would make progress, and then the Europeans or the Japanese would come back and start right where we began hours before…You had to conclude that the outcome they wanted was the outcome we got: a collapse." ("Impasse on Trade Delivers a Stinging Blow to Clinton," (NYT 12/5/99))

Finally, contributing to the debacle in Seattle was Clinton’s own domestic political difficulties, compounded by his efforts to shore up the democratic credentials of Vice-President Albert Gore (the principal democratic contender for the U.S. Presidency) as a friend of labor and environmental groups-- traditional Democratic Party constituencies. Indeed, in many respects, the failure of the White House to exercise leadership was critical to the unwinding of the Seattle talks. The U.S. delegation, which was uncomfortable with pressing for the inclusion of labor and environmental standards to begin with, was further undercut by presidential rhetoric that trade groups should use sanctions to enforce core labor rights around the world, exceeding the administration’s own line that it was merely pressing the WTO to set up a study group on labor issues. ("U.S. Effort to Add Labor Standards to Agenda Fails," (NYT 12/3/99)) President Clinton’s pronouncement, intended no doubt to shore up his weakening political base among core democratic constituencies, precipitated a violent reaction among leading developing nations whose delegates rejected the American approach of using sanctions to enforce non-trade related norms of conduct. In the end result, the U.S.’s inability to cobble together a coherent strategy only served to reinforce the perception that the U.S. was merely using the WTO and the proposed Millennium Round as a way to enhance its own economic influence.

One can only hope that something can be learned from the Seattle debacle. For one thing, the U.S., as the lone superpower and natural target for disgruntled coalitions, should never involve itself in multilateral diplomacy without a strategy. The U.S. came into the Seattle negotiations, apparently, with pronouncements but no pre-established support among delegates and no apparent approach to building a consensus even among developed nations and trading blocs. It should not have been asurprise that the bloc of developing nations would react badly to U.S. efforts to include labor and human rights on the agenda. Second, no effort was made to anticipate the showdown between free trade and labor by promoting alternative legal structures that could dovetail with free trade talks without wholly displacing them. Focusing his analysis on the effort by some environmental groups in Seattle to press the WTO into establishing a legal framework for the international protection sea turtles, Mr. Noland commented, "[i]f the WTO could work effectively on its own agenda and the NGOs would separate their concerns from trade, we could get both more protected sea turtles and more open markets.("Learning to Love the WTO," Foreign Affairs (September/ October 1999)). Finally, one cannot overlook the troubling pattern of Administration conduct, which once again failed to transcend domestic political pressures to fight for significant foreign policy goals. Like with the debacle to have the Senate ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (see the next article), the effort to establish a trade program that could command support from the balance of WTO delegates was too little too late. Rather than working with labor to re-channel its energies away from undermining the WTO, the Administration gave credence to a strategy the sole purpose of which was to precipitate a barnstorm against the organization. The President’s invocation of international policies of sanctions enforcement was particularly unproductive by encouraging the perception that U.S. power, not protectionism, posed the greater threat to the developing world. The Administration’s lack of conviction in its free trade policy coupled with its failure to devise a strategy to promote an inter-national consensus allowed domestic constituencies, in effect, to hijack government policy. As free-trade advocate and editorialist Thomas L. Friedman has written, "[y]ou change the world when you get the big players to do the right things for the wrong reasons. But that takes work—coalition-building with companies and consumers, and follow-up." ("Senseless in Seattle," (NYT 12/4/99)) It also takes a well devised diplomatic effort to define and shore up the procedures and goals of organizations like the WTO, which can potentially be used by special interests to advance anti-free trade agendas.  

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban

While the failure of the Seattle talks to determine the agenda for the proposed Millennium Round of Trade negotiations represented a slap in the face to the Clinton Administration, the Administration had earlier been thwarted in the area of international security. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ("CTBT"), which was signed by the United States in 1996, was supposed to be another bulwark against nuclear proliferation in the manner of the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. Pursuing an unclear legislative strategy against an organized and determined group of anti-treaty Republicans, the Clinton Administration failed to obtain Senate ratification, which not only embarrassed the White House, but also, some have argued, undermined the nation’s perceived commitment to arms control. After months of criticizing the Republican majority leadership of the Senate for stalling debate over the CTBT, Trent Lott, the Republican majority leader reversed himself, directing 10 hours of debate and a quick vote at a time when less than the 2/3 of the Senate supported it (at least 2/3 of the Senate is required to consent to a treaty for it to become ratified and thereby legally binding on the U.S.). Although the Administration should take half of the blame for not effectively engaging the public until the last, possible minute, the other half should be attributed to the Senate’s procedural rules and the rules of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which allowed the Chairman of that committee to stall debate on the CTBT for over 2 years.

The story behind how the CTBT was killed is worth a word because it is so reminiscent of other foreign policy legislation that has similarly died as a result of sly parliamentary maneuvering.

Since the CTBT was sent to the Senate for ratification in 1996 it was bottled up in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, who was Chairman of the Committee and thus was empowered to set the Committee’s agenda, refused to hold hearings on its ratification, effectively blocking public debate. Rather than persuading Helms’s to open hearings on the CTBT, which would have provided the Democrats the time to rally their forces for the Treaty, Senator Lott, in an unusual move, moved consideration of the CTBT out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and onto the Senate Floor for a swift debate and vote. While Democrats have been criticized for being caught flat-footed by the maneuver, it appears more likely that they were blind- sided by a Republican leadership determined to avoid the hazards of a breakdown in party discipline if a hot public debate over the CTBT ensued.

Critics of the Test Ban Treaty have expressed concern that the United States would not be able to enforce such a treaty and that ratifying it was, therefore, not in the national interest. Although many types of arms control treaties have confronted the same type of enforcement problem, the argument against the CTBT gained vitality as a result of the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May, 1999, under the very nose of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. At the same time, however, the partisan debate failed to provide alternative approaches to the multilateral treaty effort. In sum, the Senate’s action left the U.S. with no proliferation policy whatsoever. This notion was expressed in an editorial by Robert Gates, former Director of the CIA under President George Bush, in which he argued that while the CTBT was not a "good" treaty, neither the Senate nor the White House had devised an alternative policy approach. (See "One Treaty Doesn’t Fit All" (NYT 10/13/99)). On the democratic side, Paul Warnke, former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and chief arms control negotiator in 1977 and 1978, argued to the contrary that in order for the international arms control regime to be maintained, the U.S. had to set an example by ratifying the treaty. (See "The Unratified Treaty" (NYT 5/14/99))

Whether or not one believes that the CTBT can be effective in combating nuclear proliferation, having no policy regarding this increasingly important national security issue is very troubling. A recent UN experts report on the current status of international arms control underscored that the Senate’s rejection of the CTBT threatened to undermine the anti-proliferation regime by, in effect, giving the green light to potential nuclear powers to engage in testing without having to fear a word of condemnation from the world’s only superpower. ("U.S. Undercuts Arms Control Efforts, Global Panel Finds" (NYT 8/4/99)) Whether or not the Administration will be able to devise an alternative policy to fill the breach remains to be seen. In all likelihood, the policy hole will have to be filled by Mr. Clinton’s successor.

Precipitated by an incursion in July, 1999 of Islamic Fundamentalist guerrillas into neighboring Dagestan, a far-flung Russian province in the Caucasus, the Second Chechen War has been more brutal than the first and more critical to Russia’s development as an important regional power.

First, it is clear from the commitment that Russia has made to the pacification of Chechnya, that success in the War will be critical to the legitimacy of the new power structure represented by Vladimir Putin, the most recent in a parade of Prime Ministers, who is now acting President and is the most likely candidate to win the March, 2000 Presidential elections. But Chechnya is more than a necessary feel good war for Putin (after all, the Russians lost the First War back in 1996 and so are keenly aware of the dangers entailed in renewing this conflict), it is also a means of firming up Russia’s diminishing role in the Caucasus region, which is located strategically between the oil rich states of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan and the ports of call to the rest of the oil consuming world.

Proponents of the War have also noted that the pacification of Chechnya is necessary to deter any other would-be seceding regions.

For the West, it is apparent that any efforts to embarrass Russia on account of Chechnya will, at best, have no effect and, at worst, backfire. Indeed, the West’s criticism of Russia’s refugee policy and human rights record in the Chechnya War would appear only to have reinforced Russia’s view that human rights is being used by the U.S., in particular, as a pretext to marginalize Russian power in an area of significant strategic importance. That the Clinton Administration has elevated Chechnya into yet another issue in Russian-American relations is likely to cause the Russians to become even more difficult in many areas of negotiation-- from Kosovo to arms control--where Russia’s cooperation is vital.

Around the Globe and at Home

Watching George W.:

In this presidential year, the reader should consider the rhetoric of the candidates regarding their foreign policy positions. After a rough start, Republican candidate George W. Bush has been compelled to consider his own ideas concerning the "new internationalism" that he and his advisors are now espousing. The content of the new internationalism has been supplied by an increasing number of Bush foreign policy advisors led by Condoleeza Rice, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institute and Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. (See her article in Foreign Affairs, "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest" (January /February 2000)), and Robert Zoellick, a former Under-Secretary of State under the elder President Bush. (See his article in Foreign Affairs, "Campaign 2000: A Republican Foreign Policy January/February, 2000))

Whether Bush is able to develop a viable foreign policy program will depend on his ability to breathe life into the legacy of the Reagan-Bush years during which the Republicans pursued an aggressive internationalist course.

Senate Passage of the African and Caribbean Trade Bills:

On November 3, 1999, the U.S. Senate approved S. 1387 constituting a package of trade legislation to help economies in sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean. (The House had earlier passed H.R. 434) The African Trade legislation, if approved by the Conference Committee, whose mandate is to meld House and Senate versions of the bill, will become the African Trade and Development Act of 1999.

Indonesia:

In a tumultuous election, Indonesians went to the polls to effect the first peaceful transition in the country’s history, electing Abdurrahman Wahid, a respected Muslim leader, as President. The jury is out on whether Mr. Wahid has the wherewithal to re-make the country’s sagging economy and temper the military’s role in civilian affairs, but the signs are encouraging that Indonesia is on a better track to political and economic reform.

 Pakistan:

Just as Indonesia has moved in the direction of democracy, Pakistan’s democracy was eclipsed by the coup of General Pervez Musharraf, who ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in October, 1999. That the Pakistani population has over-whelmingly supported General Musharraf shows that democracy may not work everywhere. What the future of Pakistan holds is anyone’s guess, but it is anything but bright. Although, apparently, well-meaning, General Musharraf has no experience in statecraft and little instinct for economic policy. His history, however, would suggest that Indian-Pakistani relations may get worse before they get better. He has been heralded in Pakistan as the architect of the so-called Kargil Operation of Summer, 1999 (involving the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers into Indian Kashmir) which brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war.

India:

Complicating Indian-Pakistani relations further is the clear election victory of the Hindu Nationalist party under Atal Behari Vajpayee in the October, 1999 elections. It was under Vajpayee’s leadership that India took the fateful step last May of exploding its first nuclear device in 25 years.

Democratic Revolution In Venezuela?

Since his election as President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, true to his word, has initiated the process of dismantling much of his country’s political and economic institutions in what he has called a democratic-social revolution. In mid-December, 1999, Venezuelans voted in favor of a new Constitution that granted Mr. Chavez considerable political power. So far, with bloodshed at a bare minimum, outsiders are holding their tongues, agog at the population’s apparent overwhelming support for Mr. Chavez’s drive to open up the political and economic system to the less affluent Venezuelan. If Mr. Chavez is successful in his revolution without turning into a classic South American dictator, it will be a shock. But with the country steadily recovering on the crest of higher oil prices (Venezuela is one of the world’s foremost oil producers), Mr. Chavez may be given the benefit of the doubt. What is interesting about Mr. Chavez’s effort is that it highlights the growing perception in the developing world that democracy can aid and abet corruption. It will be interesting to see if General Musharraf of Pakistan takes his cue from President Chavez’s experiment in bloodless social revolution.

Ivory Coast Coup:

General Robert Gueï initiated the first coup in Ivory Coast history since that nation became independent in 1960, ousting President Henry Konan Bédié. Heretofore, one of Africa’s most stable countries, the Ivory Coast has experienced mounting internal tensions as a result of President Bédié’s banning of political demonstrations and his jailing of opponents. Like with the coup in Pakistan, General Gueï’s initiative received popular support, especially among those Ivoirians who have suffered declining living standards as a result of a deteriorating economic situation.

News Clip Items:

Macao, formerly a Portuguese colony in Asia reverted to Chinese Rule on December 19, 1999.

Japan announced that it would restore food aid to North Korea and begin a negotiating process toward the establishment of diplomatic relations with that nation. (NYT 12/15/99)

An impasse over U.S. payment of its $1 billion in UN back dues was broken as a result of a legislative compromise in which conservative, anti-abortion Republicans were allowed to attach restrictions on the use of the funds, namely, that such monies would not be used to support UN family planning initiatives where abortion is preserved as an option.

In November, 1999 The United States and China signed a trade accord, purportedly paving the way to China’s admission to the World Trade Organization, but it still needs Congressional approval insofar as the Accord requires that Congress forego its annual ritual of reviewing China’s trade status. This will be a hard ritual to shelve as Labor will team up with anti-China Republicans for an interesting show. Debate on China’s trade status will be taken up in February, 2000. The accord follows on an unexpected reversal by the Clinton Administration not to pursue WTO talks with visiting Chinese Minister of Economics Zhu Rongji in Spring, 1999.

Iraq has rejected the UN Security Council’s recent resolution calling on it to allow a new inspection regime in consideration for step-wise easing of sanctions. The last inspection team (known as UNSCOM) left Iraq in the wake of the American bombing campaign (12/98). The SC and Iraq are, in effect, at a standstill. In the meantime, the United States has stepped up its support for anti-Hussein groups and, since the bombing, has sustained a low- level conflict with Iraq involving strategic bombing of air defense facilities, principally over Southern Iraq.

On July 9, 1999, Taiwan President, Lee Teng-hui announced that unification negotiations between Taiwan and China would be conducted on a "special state-to-state" basis affronting the Chinese view that Taiwan is a province of China. The U.S. has tiptoed around this potentially lethal dispute by maintaining the three no’s fiction regarding Taiwan mandated under The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979—no two Chinas, no formal recognition of Taiwan, and no status for Taiwan in international organizations. Critics of U.S. policy toward China have advocated closer ties between the U.S. and Taiwan, including entering into a defense treaty with the island.

The African continent continues to be rife with strife-- from the continuing civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo to the Ethiopian-Eritrean War that continues to bleed the Horn of Africa. In the Congo Civil War, the status of the Lusaka Peace Accords can best be analogized to a patient barely breathing. Numerous violations of the Accord have been cited. What is hoped is that the Southern Africa Development Community finds a unity of purpose in repairing the antagonisms between and among Zimbabwe, Angola, Uganda, and Rwanda-- the outside powers fueling the conflict.

There is optimism expressed by the Organization for African Unity that the framework of an Eritrean-Ethiopian Peace Treaty may be concluded very soon. The OAU indication comes following a verbal attack leveled against Ethiopia for its forced deportations of Ethiopians of Eritrean descent by U.S. House International Affairs Committee Chairman Benjamin A.Gilman. Both Eritrea and Ethiopia have been allies with the United States against the fundamentalist Islamic regime in the Sudan. On this front, another development that is likely to create tension between the U.S. and Eritrea is the recent rapprochement between Eritrea and the Sudanese fundamentalist government (reported by the BBC News Service, "Eritrean Delegation in Khartoum,"(1/13/00)). The longer the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict continues to fester, the more likely each nation increasingly will vie with the other for support from nations like the Sudan in their own region. This will effectively kill U.S. policy in the Horn of Africa, which has long been centered on developing an anti-Sudanese front.

Legal Watch:

Supreme Court arguments were heard this past fall, 1999 in National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, No. 98-2304 9June 22, 1999), in which the First Circuit struck down as an unconstitutional violation of the Federal Government’s foreign policy power under the constitution, a Massachusetts law restricting the ability of the State to purchase goods or services from individuals or companies that engage in business in Myanmar (formerly Burma)

In Creighten Ltd. V. Qatar, No. 98-7063 (July 2, 1999), the DC Federal Circuit held that the nation of Qatar had not waived its sovereign immunity under the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act because it had consented to arbitrate in France, not in the United States and, therefore, had not waived its immunity to becoming subject to litigation in an American forum.

In Grupo Mexicano de Desarolla, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., No. 98-231 (June 17, 1999), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a preliminary injunction issued by a District Court restraining certain assets located in Mexico from being transferred to creditors. The Court rejected the use of the, so-called, Mareva injunction (from the English decision, Mareva Company Naniera v. International Bulkcarriers) for being incompatible with American Law and, therefore, beyond the authority of the district court.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ntakirutimana v. Reno, No. 98-41597 (August 5, 1999), upheld as constitutional President Clinton’s Executive Order allowing for extradition to the International War Crimes Tribunal in Rwanda. Relying on Valentine v. United States, a 1932 U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Circuit Court found that such an executive agreement (which had been enacted by Congress into law as part of the 1996 defense authorization act (Public law 104-106), was valid and that a treaty was not required.

In Saudi Arabia v. Tamini, No. 98-1423 (May 21, 1999), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the commercial activity exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act did not apply in that there was no connection between the commercial acts of the sovereign and the plaintiff's action which involved a claim for child support payments. The Court also held that Saudi Arabia had not waived its sovereign immunity by virtue of a letter from Saudi Air’s Senior Manager of Government Relations that Saudi Air agreed to garnish the funds of the defendant. employee.

In March, 1999, the British Law Lords held that General Augusto Pinochet could be extradited to Spain with respect to international human rights violations committed by his regime after 1988. Pinochet ruled Chile from 1973 to 1990. Limiting a previous decision rendered in October, 1988 (which was, subsequently vacated) the House of Lords determined that 1988 marked the year in which torture committed overseas became a crime under British law. Significantly, the Law Lords re-affirmed their previous holding in October, 1998 that Pinochet was not protected by head of state immunity because the crimes at issue were international crimes rising to the level of jus cogens (crimes that under international law subject the perpetrator to prosecution wherever in the world he can be tried).

Conclusion

In all fairness to policy makers, it is, of course, much easier to cast stones from the safety of the sidelines than to be responsible for developing and implementing a proactive foreign policy strategy. The debate over the nation’s foreign policy has up to now been mostly about goals, not so much about reform in the foreign policy making process. Above all, do we want an Executive not only able to react to events but capable of implementing a strategy with some degree of discretion? Where the lines should be drawn between presidential and congressional power in foreign policy making needs serious clarification.

Quite possibly, the answer lies not so much in defining goals in terms of specific outcomes, i.e. democratic reform in China, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein of Iraq, stability in the Balkans, as in defining a process that promotes international stability and predictability, two sides of the same coin. The danger in the haphazard evolution that has taken place in the world system since the end of the Cold War is that the United States has become vulnerable to coalitions of states, i.e. Russia, France and China, whose policies are centered on reigning in U.S. power. The key to the success of U.S. foreign policy in the 21^st Century will be in being able to defuse anti-U.S. coalitions while at the same time promoting a world system that is consonant with its values and promotes stability and predictability along democratic lines. In short, the U.S. has to be more aggressive and more adept at coalition building and multilateral diplomacy. To achieve the initiative, it must be willing to cede, where necessary, a modicum of sovereign discretion to international institutions charged with promulgating and enforcing universally recognized norms of conduct. Although the fortunes of the WTO have dipped as a result of the Seattle debacle (previously described), such an organization is the harbinger of things to come in an era where nation states are finding it increasingly difficult, in the wake of rapid globalization, to control their domestic environments. The theory underlying this process-emphasis in foreign policy was described eloquently in Joseph Joffre’s brilliant article in Foreign Affairs, "How America Does It," (September/October 1997) in which he described how the U.S., by promoting the development of international organizations, has been able, at least up to now, to create a world system in which legal processes—not just military might—are at the center of great power relations.

In addition to formulating more effective strategies in the area of international institution building and law development, an equally important focus should be on developing a foreign policy process domestically that is capable of promoting policies that are strategic and not simply reactive. Essential here is a reevaluation of the relationship between the legislature and executive roles in foreign policy making. The weaknesses of the system as it exists have been apparent in the struggle the Clinton Administration has had in obtaining legislative support for the use of the President’s foreign policy power. Whether it is fast-track trade authority, the CTB Treaty discussed earlier, the ability to formulate and implement policy is becoming overburdened by the internal contradictions of the process. The result has been that U.S. credibility has suffered. The President’s word can no longer be counted on in matters affecting diplomatic relations creating an element of unpredictability that undermines the very international system that the U.S. has taken such great pains to construct.

The solution to the problem may not require formal legislation or constitutional amendment, but the initiation of a process as between the Executive and Legislative branches to develop methods of handling foreign-relations issues. Above all, some consensus needs to be fashioned regarding legislative issues that will have a significant bearing on the nation’s diplomacy and national security. Bereft of any constituency, foreign-relations legislation is vulnerable to becoming blackmail fodder for legislative interests, which seek to extract concessions from the Executive regarding issues of a wholly domestic character. One result of such tactics during the Clinton Presidency has been that many ambassadorial posts have been left vacant, i.e. the post of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations was not filled until very recently by Richard Holbrooke, architect of the Dayton Accords that concluded the Bosnian War in 1995. Legislative maneuvers that put the nation’s foreign policy process at risk should not be tolerated. Clearly, some alternative approach should be explored so as to elevate the priority of foreign policy in the legislative process.

One of the avenues that should be pursued in earnest is an educational outreach effort to apprise the public not only about the nation’s foreign relation’s goals, but the nature of the foreign policy process and how vulnerable it is to political failure. With all the discussion going on about how to define the national interest, little or no attention has been paid to how the national interest has oftentimes been held hostage to parochial interests intent on using weapons of procedure to block and obfuscate the national debate on American foreign policy.

Robert I. Goodman